“That is to say, [Engels]
contrasts the ways in which concepts are formed in dialectics as opposed to ‘metaphysics’;
he stresses the fact that in dialectics the definite contours of concepts (and
the objects the represent) are dissolved. Dialectics, he argues, is a
continuous process of transition from one definition to the other. In
consequence, a one sided and rigid causality must be replaced by interaction.
But he does not even mention the most vital interaction, namely the dialectical
relation between subject and object in the historical process, let alone give
it the prominence it deserves…For the dialectical method the central problem is
to change reality”(3)
Lukac’s main point is
that Marxism is defined by totality rather than economic determinism.
Reification, of the solidification of relationships between things and people
as a thing itself, leads to alienation in the form of a restrictive sort of
contemplation that analyzes established orders within their own context – this contemplation,
arising exclusively from reality, it powerless to change it. Lukacs proposes
dialectics as a solution to this alienation; as a metaphysical construct, the
subject and object of contemplation remain separate. Hence dialectics is able
to concern itself with changing realities rather than analyzing a given reality
from the instantaneous perspective that this reality generates. Consequently,
dialectics is not a ‘science’ in the conventional sense: it does not seek to
eliminate contradiction, but contain to contradictions within a certain thought
process to understand the role of things in a larger context. Totality is based
on interaction, or the ability to understand not the definition of a thing, but
the thing itself through interactions that lead to “a continuous process of
transition from one definition to the other.”
Lukacs emphasizes that “attempts
to deepen the dialectical method with the aid of ‘criticism’ inevitably lead to
a more superficial view. “ He justifies the necessity of totality in Orthodox Marxism, quoting (from A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy ) “ In the
study of economic categories, as in the case of every historical and social
science, it must be born in mind that
categories are therefore but forms of being, conditions of existence…” If the
dialectical method is obscured by making it subject to criticism in the same
way scientific analysis is subject to criticism, dialectics begins to look like
a “superfluous additive.”
Questions:
(1) How is it possible
that any thought process should be immune from criticism? Is Lukac actually
suggesting this, or is he claiming criticism should take a different form? How
would one undertake an examination of the validity of a dialectical method?
(2) “But we maintain
that in the case of social reality, these contradictions are not a sign of the
imperfect understanding of society; On the contrary, they belong to the nature
of reality itself and to the nature of capitalism. When totality is known they
will not be transcended and cease to be contradictions. Quite the reverse, they
will be seen as necessary contradictions arising out of the antagonisms of this
system of production.” (11) Lucaks claims that contradictions between theories
show that these theories have reached their limits, and must be transformed and
subsumed under larger theories under which these contradictions are no longer
present. Does it follow that reality in the form of concrete totality is
composed exclusively of these contradictions? Is it even possible to analyze this sort of reality without it falling apart at its contradictions? Does this make materialist dialectic incompatible with other forms of analysis?
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